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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the contemporary emergence of neo-formalist and neo-functionalist 
approaches to law-making at a time when the state is seeking to reassert, reformulate 
and reconceptualize its regulatory competence, both domestically and transnationally. 
While the earlier turn to alternative regulation modes, conceptualized under the heading 
of “legal pluralism,” “responsive law,” or “reflexive law” in the 1970s and 1980s, had 
aimed at a more socially responsive, contextualized, and ultimately learning mode of 
legal intervention, the contemporary revival of functionalist jurisprudence and its reli-
ance on “social norms” embraces a limitation model of legal regulation. After revisiting 
the Legal Realist critique of Formalism and the formulation of functionalist regulation 
as a progressive agenda, this paper reflects on both the American and German justifica-
tions of market regulation and the Welfare State in order to trace the different evolution 
towards ‘responsive law’ and legal pluralism in the U.S. and ‘post-interventionist’ and 
‘reflexive’ law in Germany. This comparison allows for an identification of the emerg-
ing transnational qualities of legal normativity in the face of a declining welfare state 
paradigm, which – at the beginning of the 21st century – appears to provide the stage for 
turning the progressive gains of the former era into a set of market-oriented justifica-
tions of private autonomy and de-regulation. 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 82) 
 
CONTENTS 
I. THE DEMISE OF THE WELFARE STATE AND THE RISE OF THE GLOBAL 
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY...................................................................................................1 
II. LAW’S PRECARIOUS POSITION IN THE POST-REGULATORY STATE.................................4 
A. Formalism and Functionalism as Methodological Ground Rules ............................... 4 
B. Formalism and Functionalism: Then and Now ........................................................... 6 
1. Promises of Formalist Law .............................................................................................9 
2. Aspirations of Functionalism........................................................................................11 
III. THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC REGULATION IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY ....................................................................................................................13 
A. The Emergence of Responsive/Reflexive Law ......................................................... 14 
1. Responsive Law ............................................................................................................14 
2. Reflexive Law ...............................................................................................................16 
B. Faces in the Mirror .................................................................................................... 21 
1. The Turn to Market .......................................................................................................23 
2. Conceptual Paths ...........................................................................................................24 
3. Déjà Vu? The Discursive Return of Reflexive Law ....................................................25 
IV. CONTRACT VERSUS CONTRACT LAW: THE FALSE PROMISE OF SOCIAL NORMS ...........26 
A. Social Norms versus Law? ........................................................................................ 27 
B. Economics versus Justice .......................................................................................... 28 
V. CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................30 
REFERENCES......................................................................................................................31 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ........................................................................................................43 
 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 82) 
- 1 - 
I. THE DEMISE OF THE WELFARE STATE AND THE RISE OF THE GLOBAL 
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 
For some time now, scholars in law, the social sciences and economics have been debat-
ing the future of legal regulation in an increasingly denationalized world. The reasons 
for this inquiry emerge from a wide variety of places and backgrounds, and every disci-
pline has been carving its own particular lens through which it perceives, traces and 
assesses the specific trajectories of institutional and conceptual change. A hallmark of 
these efforts is the growing interpenetration of disciplinary discourses, with “globaliza-
tion studies” having emerged as either the crystallization or final diffusion point—
whichever perspective one may wish to take. In the interim, writings and courses in 
“globalization and . . . .” studies have become a more or less satisfactory label for these 
border-crossing inquiries into the driving forces of global regulatory changes, national 
path-dependencies and newly emerging norm-creating actors. Despite their political 
divisions, these studies, which have produced numerous guides to these phenomena 
from within very vibrant scholarly discourses,1 suggest that there is no way back to a 
world before globalization.2 
One way, then, of identifying the consequences of globalization has been to celebrate 
the “liberation” of commercial actors from government intervention by making effective 
use of jurisdictional forum-shopping, tax havens and radically decentralized business 
organization structures. Another one, arguably on the other end of the choice-
continuum, would seek to radicalize globalization’s de-hierarchization trends3 in search 
of realizing and nurturing civic and other bottom-up emancipatory powers, however 
uncomfortably and inevitably they remain situated between assertions of the global and 
the local.4 Rejecting findings of unstoppable convergence across distinct political 
economies, globalization scholars point to the ever-recurring, well-known, nation-state-
based distinctions and argumentative patterns: where proponents of globalization ele-
                                                 
1. See, for example, the by now “classical” Globalization reader GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION: POWER, AUTHORITY 
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE ((Held and McGrew 2002); THE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALISATION ((Michie 2003); 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD ((Nye and Donahue 2000); (de Soto 2000); (Sachs 1999); (Slaughter 
2004). 
2. (Koskenniemi 2005b) (arguing how a deeply fragmented regulatory and conflicting global landscape is reflected 
in a highly contested discursive realm, necessitating hard political choices). 
3. (Teubner 1997b). 
4. (Sousa Santos 2002); LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW. TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY ((Sousa 
Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito 2005); CRITICAL BEINGS. LAW, NATION AND THE GLOBAL SUBJECT ((Fitzpatrick 
and Tuitt 2004), in particular (Fitzpatrick 2004), & (Pahuja 2004). 
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vate the necessary containment of government regulation of market affairs as the defin-
ing feature of a globalized world, critics deconstruct such claims as “ideology.”5 
The question remains, where to go from there? Karl Polanyi’s concern with the 
“double movement” constituted by the emancipation of individual autonomy and the 
pursuit of public welfare, which he identified as the greatest challenge posed by the self-
regulating market at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries,6 is still on the 
agenda—or is it? 
An answer to this question is anything but obvious. The fundamental institutional 
reference points of political and legal regulation throughout the West in the twentieth 
century have become thoroughly unanchored, and as we see a conceptual shift from 
“government to governance” in contemporary sociological and political analysis,7 law—
in this scenario—appears to have become a fragile project. After its rise through the 
Rule of Law, the Social Interventionist State and the Welfare State, its contemporary 
fate seems to be both sealed and indeterminate. Sealed with respect to the state’s fading 
regulatory impact on border-crossing societal entities and activities, which have power-
fully emancipated themselves from jurisdictional boundaries and confinements. Inde-
terminate, in turn, in at least two ways: the state might be reasserting itself either as uni-
tary actor or through regulatory cooperation and concerted efforts against global threats 
such as environmental destruction or terrorism. Then, again, it might not.8 The second 
avenue towards indeterminacy is paved with strong doubts as to the state’s capacity to 
remain an influential institution in channeling and shaping political governance domes-
tically. As the state becomes one of several actors in a dramatically de-hierarchized 
knowledge society, the state’s proprium—political government, market regulation, ad-
ministration, responsibility for social infrastructure, guarantor of institutional arrange-
ments (education, health, safety) that during the Welfare State’s era were created to 
complement a constantly expanding body of individual rights9—seems to have come 
undone. Alternatives to state-originating, “public” governance models abound, and pro-
posals of “post-regulatory,” “new,” and “experimental” governance are offered both in 
competition to separation-of-powers and hierarchy-defined models10 and in descriptive 
                                                 
5. (Steger 2003), “Moreover, the claim that globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of mar-
kets solidifies as ‘fact’ what is actually a contingent political initiative.” Id. 
6. (Polanyi 1944), re-published in 2001 with a Foreword by Joseph Stiglitz and an Introduction by Fred Block; for a 
new and fruitful assessment of Polanyi’s thesis, see (Beckert 2007). 
7. (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992); (Sassen 2003). 
8. For an overview of such options, see (Goldsmith and Posner 2005); (Scott and Stephan 2006); (Guzman and 
Meyer 2008); (Guzman 2008). 
9. (Sunstein 1990), in particular chapter 1. 
10. (Teubner 1986); (Scott 2004a); (Dorf and Sabel 1998); to see the elaboration specifically in the case of EU gov-
ernance read (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). 
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fashion to depict, more adequately, the complex structures of today’s intersection of 
politics and economics.11 
Much of the current mapping work of the knowledge society that is being done in the 
social sciences12 and law13 unfolds in parallel with incredibly fruitful economics re-
search, predominantly within “New Institutional Economics”—both inside14 and out-
side15 of its disciplinary confines. As these interdisciplinary findings are beginning to be 
translated back towards a more challenging reassessment of respective doctrinal and 
conceptual starting points,16 the erosion of distinctions such as public/private, econom-
ics/politics or state/market is mirrored by a renewed, radical push for applied, objective 
sciences. Perhaps because said distinctions become regarded as representative idiosyn-
crasies of a century bogged down in the struggle over competing political economy uto-
pias, some of today’s analytical assessments and policy prescriptions read strangely 
simple and straightforward.17 Yet, as is well known, the devil is in the details, and these 
details lie in the ever-more complex structure of today’s invaryingly interdependent 
societies. As we seek to rescue the larger questions around societal organization from 
the twentieth into the twenty-first century against the background of concepts, instru-
ments and tools that are dramatically losing their explanatory power, the consequences 
for disciplines such as law, economics, sociology or political science have for some 
time now18 started to unfold,19 both in research and teaching.20 
This paper raises the question of the fate of law in the arrangements of twenty-first 
century post-regulatory regimes. It does so with the single mandate of contrasting the 
manifold implications and involvements of law in societal organization during the last 
century with its precarious and endangered place in today’s domestic and transnational 
settings. Choosing formalism and functionalism as the central methodological tenets in 
present-day contentions of law’s place in the regulation of societal affairs, this paper 
seeks to illuminate the background and prospects of this development by revisiting the 
functionalist critique of legal formalism at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth 
                                                 
11. (Pels 2005), “A vigorous ‘economics of politics’ is currently flanked by an equally vigorous ‘politics of econom-
ics.’” Id. at 270. 
12. (Willke 2007); (Hassan 2003); (Stehr 2001). 
13. (Ladeur 1992); (Ladeur 1995); (Ladeur 2006). 
14. See (North 1990) and the insightful counterpoints developed by (David 1994); (David 2000). 
15. In sociology: (Beckert 2007); in law: (Schanze 2007). 
16. (Calliess and Zumbansen 2008); (Amstutz 2008); see the Symposium Issue on “LAW, THE STATE AND 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY,” published in 9 GERMAN L.J. 389-546 (2008), available at 
www.germanlawjournal.com. 
17. Richard Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (1995); Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat (2005). 
18. (Merry 1988); (Sousa Santos 1987); but see (Teubner 1992). 
19. See, for a series of very informative and insightful roadmaps into this new territory, (Schiff Berman 2005); 
(Schiff Berman 2007b); (Schiff Berman 2007a). 
20. Harry W. Arthurs, Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of Legal Fields, 12 CAN. J. 
L. & SOC’Y 219 (1997); (Scott 2005); (Bernstein 2007); (Reimann 2004); (Valcke 2004). 
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century onward until the demise of normative functionalism in the retreating welfare-
state of the late twentieth century (II). The next section compares the critique of welfare 
state “juridification” by both conservatives and progressives as it emerged in Western 
European legal thought in the 1970s and 1980s with the emergence of legal pluralism 
and “extra-legal activism” in the United States at that time, tracing the rise of responsive 
and reflexive law (III) before addressing the current return of formalism and functional-
ism in the area of contract law (IV). Section V concludes. 
II. LAW’S PRECARIOUS POSITION IN THE POST-REGULATORY STATE 
A. Formalism and Functionalism as Methodological Ground Rules 
Throughout the last century, the modes of legal regulation were continuously contested, 
challenged and differentiated as the arms of the state began to reach ever deeper into the 
spheres of societal activity. In contrast, the current formalist legal discourse suggests a 
deep skepticism towards the concept of “order through law” altogether. This renaissance 
of legal formalism occurs at a time of profound changes in societal governance. It is this 
context of social change that gives the current legal theory assessments such crucial 
weight and impact. As the shift “from government to governance” points to an irre-
versible transformation from hierarchically organized political regulation to a heterar-
chy of conflicting and competing regulatory models, the fate of law itself, previously 
deeply implicated in the formulation of political governance, is becoming highly pre-
carious. What is problematic in the neo-formalist focus on the ‘here and now’ is the loss 
of historical reference points, by which contemporary contentions could be re-
embedded or contrasted with preceding experiences in legal regulation. As today’s turn 
to private ordering arguably occurs in response to the dramatic challenges for legal 
regulation domestically and transnationally, its present triumph comes at the price of 
making invisible, the deeply dialectic nature of law in its eternal coexistence with alter-
native forms of social regulation that have marked law during the twentieth century. 
Today’s neo-formalist attack on legal regulation is complemented by a neo-
functionalist prioritization of private ordering over “state intervention.” Neo-
functionalism defines the role of law and the state through the single mandate of facili-
tating individual autonomy. Whereas much of the twentieth century was characterized 
by the central role of the state and by the creation of policy-driven legal norms and judi-
cial opinions that fueled an ambitious program of social engineering through law, pre-
sent contentions of functionalism emphasize the values of market freedom and competi-
tion as endangered by state intervention. 
With unacknowledged irony, this substitution of a functionalist protection of the in-
terests of society through law with a large-scale retreat of the state in the name of indi-
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vidual freedom and the “demands of the market” employs the very theoretical tools that 
progressive lawyers in the United States and in Europe promoted during the 1970s and 
1980s as responses to the regulatory crisis of the welfare state. Those progressive schol-
ars had turned to alternative modes of legal regulation seeking to translate law’s gener-
ality into contextual, learning forms of socio-legal regulation. Their hope had been 
thereby to save the political ambitions of the welfare state, while continuing the socio-
political debate over the substance and direction of political intervention. In contrast, 
today’s neo-formalism and neo-functionalism threatens to cut the ties between current 
quest to answer the challenges of globalization and the previous struggles over law and 
politics. Its proponents characterize legal regulation as inappropriately policy-driven 
and as undue infringement of the societal actors’ capacity to regulate their own affairs 
autonomously. 
Contract law provides one example. If today’s neo-formalists criticize contract law 
as paternalistic, cost-producing and competition-stifling, they posit that contractual bar-
gains would, if left alone, be more efficient and productive.21 This assessment is a-
historical in that it bears no connection with decades of negotiation over the optimal 
degree of protection afforded to the interests of contracting parties in a fast-evolving 
mass-consumer society. The cloud of neo-formalist contentions that judges are allegedly 
incompetent in their dealings with complex contractual arrangements22 makes this mul-
tidimensional, complex nature of contractual governance disappear.23 
Touching here24 on one of these fields—contract law—the paper analyzes the con-
temporary emergence of neo-formalist and neo-functionalist approaches to law-making 
in light of the proliferation of indirect forms of regulation. The core tenet of the paper is 
that while the earlier turn to alternative regulation modes, whether conceptualized under 
the heading of “legal pluralism,”25 “responsive law,”26 or “reflexive law”27 in the 1970s 
and 1980s, had aimed at a more socially responsive, contextualized, and ultimately 
                                                 
21. (Posner 2000); (Scott 2000); (Scott and Triantis 2006). 
22. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (n. 21), at 152 “Courts have trouble understanding the simplest of business 
relationships.” 
23. See (Cohen 1927); (Cohen 1932); for a masterful reconstruction of contract law discourse in the United States, 
see (KREITNER 2007); for a recent reminiscence within the German private law academy, see the book review by 
Fritz Rittner of FRITZ VON HIPPEL, DAS PROBLEM DER RECHTSGESCHÄFTLICHEN PRIVATAUTONOMIE (1936) in 62 
JURISTENZEITUNG 1043 (2007) (reading von Hippel’s book as an important defence of private autonomy of rele-
vance in present times, that Rittner sees characterized by a(nother) takeover of private autonomy through poli-
tics). 
24. For a discussion of a neo-functionalist approach to corporate law regulation, see Peer Zumbansen, Varieties of 
Capitalism and the Learning Firm. Corporate Governance and Labor in the Context of Contemporary Develop-
ments in European and German Company Law, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 467 (2007), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=993910; for administrative law, see (Zumbansen 2003). 
25. For an excellent presentation and discussion, see (Moore 1973); (Griffiths 1986); (Merry 1988); (Teubner 1997a). 
26. (Nonet and Selznick 1978). 
27. (Teubner 1983); (Wiethölter 1985). 
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learning mode of legal intervention, the contemporary revival of functionalist jurispru-
dence embraces a limitation model of legal regulation, the rationale of which is captured 
by references to “efficiency” and “market demands.” By treating market demands and 
private interests as self-explanatory givens and by shifting the burden for “intervention” 
into market activities to policy-makers and judges, the current turn to private ordering 
effectively takes politics out of the equation.28 With that, the neo-formalist and neo-
functionalist critique of the welfare state’s ambitious programs of legal regulation ig-
nores the degree to which the welfare state itself always represented only one of many 
different possible institutional evolutionary steps in market regulation and in an ongoing 
societal debate over the best form of governing society.29 To be sure, by not integrating 
the emergence, justification and contestation of the welfare state into the present promo-
tion of individual rights against governmental paternalism, neo-formalists and neo-
functionalists isolate their assertions about market-ordering from a wider political de-
bate in which institutions such as the rule of law, the social or welfare state, private 
autonomy, property rights and democracy should rightly be seen not as means by them-
selves, but as mere institutional milestones and labels in a continuing normative evolu-
tion of social ordering.30 
B. Formalism and Functionalism: Then and Now 
The battle between law and politics is nothing new; it marks the legal debates through-
out the twentieth century. In continental Europe, mainly Germany and France, this nar-
rative sequences a development of the relation between law and the state from the Rule 
of Law31 through an Interventionist,32 Social state33 through to the welfare state34 before 
depicting a growing tension between transformations of the state into an Enabling, or 
Moderating state35 on the one hand, and new concepts of society (Risk,36 Knowledge,37 
Information,38 Network Society39) on the other. In England, the debate was predomi-
nantly focused on preserving a formal core of law40 against its moralization or politici-
                                                 
28. See, e.g., (Trebilcock 1993). 
29. (Luhmann 1990a). 
30. (Reich 1964); (Reich 1990a); (Kreitner 2005); (Zumbansen 2007). 
31. (Grimm 1991). 
32. (Stolleis 1989). 
33. (Majone 1993). 
34. (Ewald 1986); (Luhmann 1990a). 
35. (Schuppert 1999); for a discussion of this sequence of descriptions of the state, see (Zumbansen 2003). 
36. (Beck 1992). 
37. (Burke 2000). 
38. (Ladeur 2002). 
39. (Castells 1996). 
40. (Hart 1958). 
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zation.41 By contrast, in the United States, the narrative still traces the content, validity 
and promises of the “Realist”42 (later the “Social”) challenge to nineteenth century 
“classical legal thought”43 that eventually led to a fierce struggle over “rights”44 and to 
the frustrated reaction in the form of extra-legal activism.45 Next occurs the powerful 
rise of law and economics46 and the contestation by legal pluralism and critical legal 
studies,47 later opening up into a babel of voices of multiple, competing and conflicting 
societal interests.48 The battle over law and politics gains its concrete contours within a 
specific socio-economic, cultural, and political context.49 The relevance of comparing 
different contexts has recently been noted by scholars, who have taken it upon them-
selves to depict larger trends and trajectories in the development of legal thought, writ-
ing from both a historical and comparative perspective.50 The importance of such baro-
metric and comparative assessments lies in their tentative and explorative nature. Given 
the tremendous unruliness of doctrinal categories and of social science models and cate-
gories with which we have been trying to identify the core of law in an age of govern-
ance,51 it is of great merit to push for a historical, comparative and interdisciplinary re-
search program, precisely because we are at an important moment for the reassessment 
of the role of law. 
Neo-formalism and neo-functionalism as the angles from which to assess the current 
regulatory landscape shed a brighter light on the role of law within the continuing poli-
tics of privatization. By focusing on neo-formalism and neo-functionalism, one gains a 
clearer view of how arguments of “necessity,” of “objectivity” and “naturalness” pre-
pare the ground for a functionalist interpretation and application of legal norms in con-
texts that are clearly characterized by fundamental shifts from public to private regula-
tion.52 The presently renewed attack on contract adjudication and governmental “inter-
vention” wrongly depicts a market existing without a government at the very outset.53 
                                                 
41. (Hart 1977). 
42. Compare (Singer 1988) with (Leiter 1997); see (Fuller 1958); (Dworkin 1975). 
43. (Pound 1908); but see later the reorientation of Dean Pound in (Pound 1931), and the reply by (Llewellyn 1931). 
44. (Mensch 1981). 
45. (Lobel 2007). 
46. (Calabresi 1970); (Posner 1973); for a “semi-outsider’s”  history, see Anita Bernstein, Whatever happened to Law 
and Economics?, 64 Md. L. Rev. 303 (2005). 
47. (Galanter 1974); (Griffiths 1986); (Arthurs 1988). 
48. For an excellent overview, see Günter Frankenberg, Down by Law: Irony, Seriousness, and Reason, 83 NW. U. L. 
REV. 360 (1988), and (Kennedy 2006). 
49. (Hutchinson 1995) “Judges, policy-makers, economists, lawyers, and citizens are forever situated in a socio-
economic context that influences them as they strive to influence it.” Id. 
50. See (Berman 2005); (Michaels and Jansen 2007). 
51. (Wiethölter 1986b); (Wiethölter 1986a). 
52. (Aman Jr. 1997). 
53. See (Knight 1924). “The system as a whole is dependent on an outside organization, an authoritarian state, made 
up also of ignorant and frail human beings, to provide a setting in which it can operate at all.” Id. 
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This depiction of the market and the state as separate worlds enters into a troubling alli-
ance with policy recommendations, which promote the privatization of public services 
and are often fuelled by arguments of efficiency and cost reduction.54 Whether or not, 
and in which forms, private actors assume formerly public regulatory functions, is not 
simply a sociological issue. It represents the outcome of political choices and of other 
socio-economic developments, unfolding at both the national and transnational level.55 
The allegedly available “fresh start” for societal self-regulation without state interfer-
ence stands in stark contrast to the observation already made decades ago - that when 
market actors are enabled and empowered to exercise their private autonomy they are 
exercising this freedom based on a public choice.56 
The law of contract, then, through judges, sheriffs, or marshals puts the sovereign 
power of the state at the disposal of one party to be exercised over the other party. 
[. . .] The law of contract may be viewed as a subsidiary branch of public law, as a body 
of rules according to which the sovereign power of the state will be exercised as be-
tween the parties to a more or less voluntary transaction.57 
As contractual governance has come, since the 1970s and 1980s, to form an ever-
more important part of large-scale privatization and delegation politics,58 policies of 
privatizing formerly public services and competences by delegating power to lower lev-
els are often implemented without a comprehensive normative assessment of the merits 
and goals of such delegation.59 But, the empowerment of market actors often results 
from a complex combination of historically evolved patterns of individualism,60 decen-
tralized government61 and regulatory competition.62 The promise of private autonomy 
and individual freedom, which is being carved out within this context can only be un-
                                                 
54. For a critique, see (Aman Jr. 2001). 
55. This led Philip Jessup to his capturing three dramas about constellations within and beyond the nation state that 
involve parallel questions of democracy and participation. See (JESSUP 1956). 
56. (Cohen 1927). 
57. (Cohen 1932). 
58. (Harden 1992); (Freeman 2000): “. . .the contract becomes a framework and a set of default rules that will help 
direct future gap filling.” 
59. (Willis 1935). “(. . .) power to make regulations and questions of principle should not, in general, be granted to a 
department; for a department, not being responsible to the electorate for its policy, is unlikely to give sufficient 
consideration to the question whether or not the regulations are sufficiently in accordance with public opinion to 
command general obedience.” Id. 
60. See, (Tawney 1920). See also (Knight 1924). “Human beings are not ‘individuals’, to begin with; a large majority 
of them are not even legally competent to contract. The values of life are not, in the main, reducible to satisfac-
tions obtained from the consumption of exchangeable goods and services.” Id. See also (Kreitner 2007). “Late 
nineteenth-century contract law took shape in the conflicts that were the culmination of this process of imagining 
the individual subject. That vision of contract, and that imagination of the subject, in turn govern the way Ameri-
cans think about contract even today.” Id. (Frug 1983) (describing the “market” as a “battleground where oppos-
ing forces can fight over the kind of policeman assigned to oversee the bureaucracy.”). 
61. See (Frug 1980). 
62. (Tiebout 1956). 
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derstood against the background of this historically grown and continuously evolving 
polycontextural architecture.63 In other words, private autonomy neither arises from nor 
exists in a normative or structural vacuum. 
1. Promises of Formalist Law 
Ever since Max Weber described legal evolution as occurring on a trajectory from reli-
gious (charismatic) through traditional to rational, formal authority,64 legal scholars 
have been conceptualizing new challenges to legal regulation against this evolutionary 
background.65 It is particularly the historical, socio-economic context of Weber’s writ-
ing that proves so important for today’s assessment of his contribution. Weber’s discus-
sion of formal law occurred precisely at a time when law’s allegedly formal qualities 
had come under close scrutiny from an arising political legal theory that targeted the 
role of judges in “applying the law”66 by resorting to a heaven of pure legal concepts.67 
Weber’s analysis of formal law was complemented by keen observations of the institu-
tional changes that characterized the new relations between state and market, changes 
that in their complexity had become the focus of emerging sociological thought and 
conceptualization68 and which soon prompted more explorations of turn-of-the-
century’s industrialization and the emerging hegemony of the market.69 
Formal, in contrast to substantive rationality, would claim that the law is “inherently 
certain and predictable.”70 Formalism, enshrined for example in the proposition of the 
“rule of law,” could be directed against arbitrary power.71 Taken as such, it would mean 
to resist a “social agenda”72 and “judicial activism”73 in the name of the letter of the 
                                                 
63. (Verkuil 2007); Gunther Teubner, State Policies in Private Law? A Comment on Hanoch Dagan, The Limited 
Autonomy of Private Law  56 AM. J. COMP. L. 835 (2008) “[T]he public/private distinction is an oversimplified 
account of contemporary society. [. . .] Contemporary social practices can no longer be analyzed by a single bi-
nary distinction, neither in the social sciences nor in the law; the fragmentation of society into a multitude of so-
cial segments requires a multitude of perspectives of self-description.” Id. 
64. (Weber 1967). 
65. See, for example, the masterful depiction by (Trubek 1972a); for another brilliant, recent reconstruction, see 
(Kennedy 2004). 
66. (Holmes 1897). 
67. (Cohen 1935). 
68. See Emile Durkheim’s preface to the second edition of his THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY [1893] (W.D. 
Halls, transl., 1984), where he depicts a society consisting only of individuals as a “veritable sociological mon-
strosity,” which he sees transformed by a “progressive weaken[ing]” of territorial or communal ties and the rise 
of mediating entities. Id. at liv. 
69. (Polanyi 1944). 
70. (Kennedy 1973). 
71. (Hutchinson and Monahan 1987). “At times, the Rule of Law has been used to legitimize and galvanize a chal-
lenge to entrenched power; at others, the ruling elite has relied upon it to sanction its power and resistance to 
would-be usurpers.” Id. 
72. For a brilliant analysis, see (Mattei and Nicola 2006). 
73. For a critique, see (Kennedy 1997); see (Kennedy 1987). 
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law.74 Formalism would come to stand at the center of the magical, yet fragile, construc-
tion of a “rule of law”, presupposing the law’s capacity to negotiate and thereby to 
translate, according to defined procedural rules, the different contestations and political 
manifestations of diverging interests in society into a reliable and predictable catalogue 
of “state action.”75 Yet, as the functions of government continued to expand, such trans-
latory practice76 would always carry with it the danger that law would lose its center, its 
foothold and autonomy.77 As formalism claimed that the law could be understood from 
within, primarily by extrapolating a logical structure of a confined set of norms from a 
small set of higher-order78 principles, the need to recognize one or the other substantive 
bases for the edifice of formal law became just too apparent. Lawyers, writing at a time 
of extreme socio-economic and legal crisis, saw clearly that the association of a system 
of law with a particular system of political government posed dramatic challenges for 
any understanding of law in and of itself.79 Elaborations of the functions of the state in 
the context of a rapidly rising industrial society, accompanied by societal hardship and 
political contestation, exposed legal formalism to a sweeping challenge in the name of 
different values and interests. The more the state and its emanations through legislative, 
administrative and judicial acts would change, the more this would have a fundamental 
impact on law itself.80 With formal law turning functional, the covers of formalism’s 
foundations were irrevocably drawn away.81 
                                                 
74. See (Leiter 1999), at 1145-46, enumerating the following three criteria of formalism: “(1) law is rationally deter-
minate, (2) judging is mechanical, [. . .] (3) legal reasoning is autonomous, since the class of legal reasons suf-
fices to justify a unique outcome; no recourse to non-legal reasons is required.” See also (Sunstein 1999). “For-
malism therefore entails an interpretive method that relies on the text of the relevant law and that excludes or 
minimizes extratextual sources of law.” Id. 
75. (Kennedy 1973). 
76. For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of translation in this context, see JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS 
TRANSLATION (1990). 
77. (Hart 1977). 
78. See (Weinrib 1988). “The rationality, immanence, and normativity that characterize [formalism] are not dis-
jointed attributes contingently combined, but mutually connected aspects of a single complex.” Id. See also id. at 
1012-13 for an enumeration of the elements of his definition of formalism. In the same vein, defending formalism 
against the critique of being non-political, is (Schauer 1988): “I do not argue that formalism is always good or 
that legal systems ought often or even ever be formalistic. Nevertheless, I do want to urge a rethinking of the con-
temporary aversion to formalism. For even if what can be said for formalism is not in the end persuasive, the is-
sues should be before us for inspection, rather than blocked by a discourse of epithets.” 
79. See, e.g., (Duguit 1917). 
80. (Duguit 1925), XI. “Toute etude scientifique du droit n’a-t-elle pas nécessairement pour objet l’évolution des 
institutions juridiques? Étudier les transformations du droit public, n’est-ce pas étudier tout simplement le droit 
public? Assurément.” Id. 
81. (Loughlin 2005). 
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2. Aspirations of Functionalism 
“Therefore the idea of the social man is the only possible 
starting point of juridical doctrine.”82 
 
Functionalism could be merely the (younger) sibling of formalism, its necessary com-
plementary and correcting feature. Formalist law would have to be functional in order to 
survive challenges arising from societal differentiation, political contestation, seculari-
zation and economic growth. As such, functionalism may also be understood as an out-
right challenge to the formalist claim to self-restriction. Functionalism would then be a 
fitting formula for law’s ability to survive, mainly by remaining adaptable and respon-
sive. Functionalism in law describes the way in which the flexibilization and moderni-
zation of formal law, in reaction to an increasingly complex social environment, made 
up of competing interests, claims and contestations, takes place if law is to retain a 
steering function in the trials of society. Functionalism, thus understood, therefore des-
ignates the degree to which the law answers to requirements, customs, and necessities 
emerging from social practice or crystallizing out of public policy deliberations. The 
important feature here is that a functionalist approach in any legal area, from adminis-
trative to contract to corporate law, is based on the premise that regulation is in fact pos-
sible. What functionalism itself does not answer is who the author of regulation should 
be. 
Where functionalism understands law as a means to achieve particular social, politi-
cal or economic ends,83 this could speak in favor of governmental “intervention” or 
against it, either stressing the ‘embeddedness’ of individual freedom or underlining the 
merits of unfettered private autonomy.84 The institutional consequences as well as the 
normative underpinnings of functionalism are not, at first, so easy to see. The function-
alism that responded to legal formalism’s abstract sovereignty over a deeply divided, 
violently emerging market society embraced the idea that generally there was, or could 
be, a societal consensus on the desirability of the goals pursued. Given that law was to 
navigate in deeply troubled waters, it was also clear that conflicts would inevitably arise 
with regard to the concrete strategies and instruments to pursue those goals.85 Not sur-
prisingly, legal and social theory scholars spilled considerable amounts of ink over the 
                                                 
82. (Duguit 1917). 
83. (Pound 1910). This is only one of several possible concepts of functionalism; see Ralf Michaels, The Functional 
Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 343 et seq., especially 351 
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007). 
84. (Dicey 1905). “Legislative utilitarianism is nothing else than systematized individualism, and individualism has 
always found its natural home in England.” Id. That, however, Dicey found to be endangered by and in need of 
protection against: “democratic despotism.” Id. at 304-05. “The legislative tendency was the constant extension 
and improvement of the mechanism of government.” Id. 
85. (Cohen 1935) (highlighting that critics of legal formalism, “legal magic and word jugglery” were struggling to 
reach a consensus of what the next step after the rejection of formalism should be). 
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optimal conceptualization of an adequate regulatory approach to a fast-changing soci-
ety, characterized by the increasing emergence of conflict zones and conflicting social 
interests.86 Scholars of contract law87 began to explore the constitutionalizing potential 
of private law to inform models of “private government,” unfailingly recognizing the 
political nature of private law regulation.88 Corporate Law scholars and economists ex-
plored the troubling position of the ‘modern corporation’ between private and public 
law, between investors’ private property interests and the larger societal interests in the 
sustained economic performance of the corporation.89 Echoing corporate lawyers’ trou-
ble with delineating the optimal forms of regulating business, administrative law schol-
ars found themselves between the firing lines of the state and the market in a fast-
evolving mixed economy of intersecting private and public actors.90 In the United States 
as in Western Europe, administrative lawyers were soon awakening to their highly poli-
ticized role in operating a constitutional polity through the stormy seas of pre-war, 
interwar and post-war economies and ideological contestations of democratic govern-
ment.91 Central to all these scholarly endeavors was the role of scientific progress and 
the role of experts in finding the best legal solution.92 A major challenge for legal func-
tionalism, largely unmet, was the degree to which a government that was activist, re-
sponding to crises and delivering public services, could succeed in promoting democ-
ratic representation in the elaboration and execution of its ambitious policies.93 Paving 
the way for the early twenty-first century’s arrival of neo-functionalism, the techno-
cratic functionalism of the expanding twentieth century welfare state had widened, not 
bridged, the gap between the state and its citizens in complex, differentiated, multicul-
tural and transnational societies. 
[A]s the ideals of the Functional Society came only to be partly realized in the 
twentieth-century welfare state, the functionalist style in public law tended to 
preserve itself more as a disposition than as the exposition of an alternative so-
cial philosophy. And once this happened, the more positivistic aspects of func-
                                                 
86. (Hale 1923); (Cohen 1932); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE 
BRAMBLE BUSH [1930] (1952). 
87. (Llewellyn 1930). 
88. (Llewellyn 1934). 
89. (Berle and Means 1932); for a concise assessment of Berle and Means’ historical contribution and their subse-
quent appropriation for a shareholder primacy justification of corporate (de-)regulation, see (Tsuk 2005); see also 
(Bratton and Wachter 2007). 
90. See only (Landis 1938). 
91. Harold Laski, The Pluralistic State, 28 PHIL. REV. 562 (1919); JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: 
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT 1870-1920 (1986); (Rodgers 1998); (Stolleis 2004). 
92. See only (Holmes 1897), and (Landis 1938). 
93. (Loughlin 2005). 
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tionalism (power vs. power) gained the upper hand, and the underlying idealist 
dimensions were suppressed.94 
Carl Schmitt and Ernst Forsthoff, in German constitutional and administrative law, are 
the most eloquent representatives for this turn of functionalism.95 
III. THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC REGULATION IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
As the debates over the politics of legal regulation continued,96 later developments, de-
picted by labels such as globalization, global economic competition and deterritorializa-
tion,97 dramatically accentuated the normative assumptions underlying the seemingly 
neutral ideals of expert rule and scientific government. As political governments around 
the world sought to address regulatory challenges arising from cross-border develop-
ments, the hitherto pursued public programs of social policy came to be seen as resting 
on increasingly shaky ground. As globalization began to unfold within the fragile archi-
tecture of domestic legal and political systems, the challenges to both the regulatory 
concepts and instruments of the social engineers and the political hopes in the self-
ordering capacities of a democratic society became frighteningly clear. As the time ho-
rizon, against which scholars and policy makers would commit their inquiry to the pro-
ject of “making basic changes [. . .] necessary if we are to maintain the productive capa-
bility of the market economy while assuring our capacity to maintain a productive and 
healthy environment,”98 was rapidly shrinking, functionalism took on an ever more re-
active and responsive mode of adaptation. The mounting pressures on political govern-
ments to master the socio-economic and legal challenges arising from a fast-globalizing 
world of increasingly interdependent trade relations were amplified by deep-running 
societal concerns with questions of political participation, representation and redistribu-
tion. Thirty years after the end of World War II, Western industrialized nations found 
themselves under immense pressure to translate high-flying political agendas into 
workable regulatory instruments, which were increasingly met with apathy, alienation 
and implementation obstacles.99 
The challenges of globalization to domestic state-originating welfare programs—that 
had in their growth during the twentieth century involved dramatic increases in redistri-
bution, juridification and infrastructure provision—had a very domestic face. In fact, the 
                                                 
94. Id. at 402. 
95. (Schmitt 1988); (Forsthoff 2000). 
96. See, e.g., (Macneil 1978); (Macneil 1980); (Berle 1954); (Nader, Green and Seligman 1974); (Bell 1999); (Stew-
art 1981). 
97. (Sassen 2003); (Michaels 2004). 
98. (Stewart 1981). 
99. Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (1975). 
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arising critique of the welfare state’s negative effects on societal self-regulation oper-
ated with little reference to “globalization.” As the next section will show, the rise of 
welfare state critique and the emergence of alternative modes of legal regulation had its 
origins within the particular regulatory histories of expanding forms of state interven-
tion. Globalization, in turn, further accentuated and fueled a transformation of public 
governance that was already beginning to unfold from within the cores of western wel-
fare states. 
A. The Emergence of Responsive/Reflexive Law 
The disillusionment both with the propagation of “rights” as a means to address social 
inequality and with the allegedly “neutral” principles underlying legal process and adju-
dication100 eventually prepared the grounds for a growing discontent with law as a sound 
instrument of social change.101 In response, scholars on both sides of the Atlantic began 
to relativize law’s sovereignty. Feeling the weight of overly zealous and inadequate 
forms of “juridification”102 and facing the costs of a structurally and normatively ex-
hausted welfare state,103 law’s autonomy began to be seen as relative. Scholars saw law 
as one among several modes of political regulation, certainly not as the only or even the 
most promising one. Some rejoiced, because they had already long been hostile to the 
state’s continued attempts to regulate economic relations.104 Others, however, reacted to 
the continued expansion of rationalist, bureaucratic regulation into the ‘life-world’ with 
grave concerns over the viability of informal, culturally grounded understandings as the 
basis for societal self-regulation and cohesion.105 
1. Responsive Law 
In a small volume, published in 1978, Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick carved out a 
political theory of legal regulation, in the center of which they placed the concept of 
“responsive law.”106 They aptly characterized the contemporary U.S. society as torn by 
competing views on an ideal social order and placed the search for law at the center of 
this larger battle: “Whatever the labels, and whatever the ideological affinities, these 
                                                 
100. (Wechsler 1959). 
101. (Lobel 2007) (describing the emergence of extra-legal activism in response to the disillusionment with “rights”). 
102. (Teubner 1987). 
103. (Habermas 1989). 
104. See the remarkable 1976 foreword by Hayek to his republished work, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM [1944], iii, at viii: 
“If few people in the Western world now want to remake society from the bottom according to some ideal blue-
print, a great many still believe in measures, which though not designed completely to remodel the economy, in 
their aggregate effect may well unintentionally produce this result.” 
105. Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 2 (1982) [Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 
2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (1985)]. 
106. (Nonet and Selznick 1978). 
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perspectives are being tested today as legal institutions adapt to changing attitudes and 
expectations, to social cleavage and disaffection.”107 Building on Weber’s depiction of 
the rational quality of modern law, Nonet and Selznick recognized the increasing differ-
entiation of law into specialized areas of social ordering. As Weber had seen the system 
of law to be depending in large part on the emergence of a professional body of legal 
experts, Nonet and Selznick identified how expert rule would promote a separation of 
law and politics and, increasingly, a “narrow conception of the role of law.”108 As this 
model of law removed legal regulation and regulators “from the ambit of political con-
troversy and conflict,”109 “strains, opportunities, and expectations” continued to arise 
that would lead to a conflict-laden re-approximation of law and politics.110 The paradox 
of rational government lay in the fact that the more legal experts asserted the objective 
nature of their actions, the more these actions met with critique and resistance. Respon-
sive law, then, would emerge against the background of a long-standing skepticism to-
wards the autonomy and rationality of law.111 Front and center to a post-autonomous, 
responsive model of law would be a form of legal regulation that “perceives social pres-
sures as sources of knowledge and opportunities for self-correction.”112 Responsive 
law’s self-liberation from formalism, however, moved a now explicitly “purposive law” 
(dangerously) close to policy.113 The resulting difficulties would prove immense: 
When accountability is to more general ends, dedication to rules is no longer enough 
to shield officials from criticism. But to generalize responsibilities is to run the risk of 
diluting them. General ends tend to be impotent, that is, so abstract and vague that they 
offer neither guidance in decision nor clear standards of evaluation.114 
Read against the promises of formalism studied above, the functionalist aspirations 
of responsive law put law and lawyers under immense pressure. Responding to the insu-
lation of technocratic legal rule from societal negotiations of values and interests asking 
the law to “foster civility” through an “ethic of responsibility,”115 responsive law must 
apparently rely on a problematic inner core in order not to be fully consumed by societal 
forces. This core is formed in a combination of process (participation) and substance 
(civility). At the time of their writing, Nonet and Selznick proved perfectly attuned to 
the particular challenges arising from complex governance modes in a system of multi-
layered and interdependent social organizations. Their promotion of “post-bureaucratic 
                                                 
107. Id. at 7. 
108. Id. at 59. 
109. Id. at 70. 
110. Id. at 71. 
111. Id. at 73; “The quest for responsive law had been a continuing preoccupation of modern legal theory.” Id. 
112. Id. at 77. 
113. Id. at 82-83. 
114. Id. at 83. 
115. Id. at 90-91. 
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organization”116 reflected their valuable interdisciplinary search into the emerging com-
plexities of the knowledge society.117 Both the procedural and the substantive sides of 
the reflexive law recipe to address regulatory challenges in a divided society, however, 
prove to be extremely ambitious, perhaps too ambitious. Towards the end of their book, 
the authors don’t hold back: “Responsive law presupposes a society that has the politi-
cal capacity to face its problems, establish its priorities, and make the necessary com-
mitments.”118 Here the bias of the program becomes strikingly apparent. Against the 
background of the trajectory of legal development from the nineteenth to the twentieth 
century, the authors put forward a model of substantive legal regulation that pays a high 
price to bridge the gap between law and politics, between government and society. Rec-
ognizing that any reincarnation of top-down regulation, regardless of the normative jus-
tification that is offered, would further widen the legitimacy gap in times of regulatory 
complexity and political apathy, Nonet and Selznick suggest that citizens ought to take 
law into their own hands in order to reach consensus as to the direction of social order. 
This, however, results in a powerful redirection of law to its formalist mode, operating 
in a heaven of pure legal concepts.119 How else ought we to understand the authors’ ex-
pressed hope that society come together and identify “its problems,” “its priorities,” and 
“its commitments”? The reason for the growing regulatory challenges to modern law 
was and continues to be the rising complexity of society. To address a multiplicity of 
values, interests and rationalities with a dedication to democratic governance ultimately 
to result in consensus, idealizes the forces of cohesion in a society that is actually 
deeply complex and fragmented. Therein lies, to be sure, the great danger for law, for 
political, in particular democratic theory and for any grand-scale social theory. Therein 
lays, however, at the same time, great hope to better identify the potential of law to play 
a distinct role in the complex array of voices and forces. 
2. Reflexive Law 
Meanwhile, legal theoreticians in Western Europe posited a re-conceptualization of 
regulatory law by emphasizing the necessity of law’s reflexivity, its capacity to respond 
to the changing conditions of regulatory implementation120 and the proceduralization of 
law.121 Reflexive law promoted the opening of the law to the different, varied and com-
                                                 
116. Id. at 99, with reference to Chester Barnard and Peter Drucker. 
117. Id. at 100. “Participatory decision making as a source of knowledge, a vehicle of communication, and a founda-
tion for consent.” Id. 
118. Id. at 113. 
119. (Cohen 1935). 
120. (Teubner 1983); (Ladeur 1983); (Wiethölter 1986a). 
121. (Wiethölter 1985). 
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peting rationalities of a society highly differentiated along functional lines.122 As the 
project of reflexive law became formulated in the context of an exhausted welfare 
state’s regulatory capacities, the nature of law’s involvement in societal processes was 
still at the heart of a critical inquiry into the role, function and status of law.123 With 
reflexive law emerging out of the eggshells of a fast-decaying welfare state, it was con-
ceived in light of a long generation of negative and positive civil rights, of a strong in-
terconnection between deliberation over social policy on the one hand and of the cross-
fertilization of administrative and constitutional law on the other. 
To be sure, the rise of reflexive law did not occur without contestation. Reactions, 
many of them negative, were swift and far-reaching. Niklas Luhmann observed that, if 
the concept of reflexive law implicitly or explicitly defended law’s claim to “compre-
hensive regulation,”124 reflexive law unduly and somewhat prematurely relativized the 
concept of system autonomy in a functionally differentiated society.125 Others felt that 
positing law as an “autopoietic,” i.e., autonomous, self-referentially reproducing, social 
system126 constituted a betrayal of law’s emancipatory political powers as a force of 
social transformation.127 Arguing from the perspective of democratic theory,128 the turn 
of law onto itself as autopoietic law was seen as bolstering wide-spread privatization 
and deregulation, which in turn would diminish the emancipatory forces of law.129 An-
other critique took issue with reflexive law’s connection to the concept of autopoietic 
law, which described law as operationally closed (self-reproducing) and cognitively 
open (towards its environment),130 and markedly pointed out the specific challenges for 
political (legal) theory arising from this description.131 
Reflexive law theorists, in response, acknowledged the merits of a critique of legal 
formalism and its potential to look beyond the letter of the law. But, other than the Le-
                                                 
122. (Teubner 1983); (Luhmann 1992). 
123. (Teubner 1984); (Scheuerman 2000); “Like substantive law, it is guided by the aim of subjecting social and eco-
nomic activities to broader regulatory purposes. Yet it hopes to do so without dictating specific outcomes and 
thereby contributing to the rigidity and ineffectiveness of some existing forms of regulatory law.” Id. 
124. (Teubner 1993). 
125. Niklas Luhmann, Some Problems with Reflexive Law, in STATE, LAW AND ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS 
389-412 (Gunther Teubner & Alberto Febbrajo eds., 1992). 
126. See (Teubner 1993). 
127. (Blankenburg 1984); (Rottleuthner 1989). 
128. (Maus 1986) (highlighting the dangers for regulatory capture of reflexive law when legislative acts are mostly 
general and indeterminate). 
129. This critique paralleled and echoed in many of its political it not its theoretical aspirations developments in the 
United States: (Galanter 1974); (Frug 1983) (highlighting the importance and great variances of context that in-
fluence the modes of bureaucratic organization). 
130. (Luhmann 1988b); (Luhmann 1989); “Formulations such as the statement that there are connections ‘between’ 
law and society’  (which presupposes that law is something outside of society) especially must be avoided.” Id. 
131. (Nocke 1986) (arguing that autopoietic law resembles mid-nineteenth century concept-jurisprudence – Be-
griffsjurisprudenz – that already Rudolf von Ihering and Felix Cohen had considered as out-of-sync with societal 
differentiation). See (Cohen 1935). 
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gal Realists, proponents of reflexive law sought to reach beyond an understanding of 
law that would describe its function in the resolution of conflicts between “right” and 
“left,”132 or between market regulation and freedom of contract.133  The theory of auto-
poietic law, which lay at the basis of the concept of reflexive law, posited the self-
referential nature of the societal subsystems, including law.134 This led to an understand-
ing of society as a social system made up of subsystems of particularly structured 
modes of communications. Each subsystem, then, would form the environment for an-
other system, leading to a diversified communication of societal (system) rationalities.135 
The reflexive law theorists rejected a bi-polar view regarding re-distributive outcomes 
or progressive versus conservative political agendas. Instead, they suggested that al-
though the law was placed at a unique place from which it would constantly receive 
manifold communications, influences and pressures from different parts of society, its 
evolution depended on its ability to maintain this intricate relationship to its environ-
ment.136 Its self-reproduction depended on its constant exposure to the forces of society, 
while reconstructing these signals in its own language or code. Instead of promoting the 
idea of an a-political law, the concept of reflexive law radicalized and expanded the 
older critique of legal formalism and made law receptive to the full spectrum of societal 
rationalities. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the American development became determined by 
an intricate and challenging combination of activist rejections of law as an instrument of 
the status-quo upholding power on the one hand and the differentiation of procedural 
rights on the other. The work of Charles A. Reich,137 Marc Galanter,138 David Trubek,139 
Duncan Kennedy,140 Gerald Frug,141 and Richard Stewart142 can be seen as illustrative of 
this complex combination of societal activism and conscious embrace of legal regula-
                                                 
132. Teubner’s response: “Self-organization is at odds with the traditional political co-ordinates of the simple left-right 
model.” (Teubner 1993) 64-65 (1993). But see (Nocke 1986). “Hier wird keine vorschnelle ‘Ideologiekritik’ mehr 
geübt – schon der Begriff nimmt sich in der verchromten Sprachwelt der Systemtheorie aus wie eine ehrwürdige 
Antiquität, die von den hier Tätigen freilich eher wie eine peinliche Hinterlassenschaft gemieden wird. Hier will 
keiner mehr irgend jemandem ans Leder.” Id. 
133. (Kennedy 1976); (Horwitz 1974). 
134. (Luhmann 1989). 
135. (Teubner 1993) 64-65 (1993). 
136. (Teubner and Willke 1984) (describing reflexion as a process of self-regulation through which a social system 
thematizes and adjusts its own identity in the awareness of other social systems operating in its environment in 
order to provide a useful environment for these other social systems). 
137. (Reich 1964). 
138. (Galanter 1974). 
139. (Trubek 1972b). “Since the implicit, a priori conclusions about the role of law are no longer valid, we must turn to 
specific efforts to understand the relationships among the legal, social, economic, and political orders.” Id. 
140. (Kennedy 1976); (Kennedy 1982). 
141. (Frug 1983). 
142. (Stewart 1975). 
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tion. The continued elaboration143 and contestation of these approaches144 eventually 
prepared the field for assessments of law and regulatory governance,145 which address 
the serious challenges of identifying the politics in a transnational regulatory environ-
ment,146 shaped by both public and private law,147 official and unofficial, soft and hard 
norms.148 
As demonstrated, concepts of “responsive” or “reflexive” law had emerged at the in-
tersection between a turn to or away from law as a means of social regulation. Both re-
sponsive and reflexive law had sought a way out of the dilemmas which had been iden-
tified by both progressive and conservative critics of regulation and “juridification.”149 
In light of the growing awareness that legal regulation would have to deal simultane-
ously with an increasingly complex society riddled with conflicting interests and identi-
ties on the one hand, and with a dramatically expanding scope of governmental regula-
tion of areas of society previously seen as remote, self-reliant and “private” on the other, 
legal theory had to conceptualize a new model of law adequate to this challenge. Re-
sponsive/reflexive law offered just that. In an ingenious and very ambitious way, re-
sponsive/reflexive legal theorists suggested an understanding of legal regulation as a 
process that could not be initiated from a central, elevated place of sovereignty in terms 
of power and knowledge. Instead, law would have to be understood as inherently caught 
up in the conflict-ridden processes of a functionally differentiated society.150 Despite the 
difference in degree to which scholars in the respective camps were willing to accept the 
sociological description of a post-bureaucratic society151 or a functionally differentiated 
society,152 responsive/reflexive law theorists posited that law would have to be tentative, 
experimental, and learning. Such a conception had far-reaching consequences for a con-
ceptualization and application of law in an environment that had become increasingly 
complex since the early days of the rise of the interventionist state.153 
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The striking characteristic of responsive/reflexive law was that it did not confine it-
self to the suggestion of subjecting all legal decision-making to sophisticated processes 
of deliberation and negotiation. The proceduralization of law154 did not stop at the for-
mal level, where it certainly led to a far-reaching reliance on procedure as a means to 
strengthen the law’s sensitivity to “voice” over “exit.”155 What would instead become 
central to the concept of reflexive law was its intricate (and contested) connection be-
tween formal and substantive aspects of legal regulation.156 While the formal aspects 
concerned the opening up of the legal decision-making process to a process of societal 
deliberations (“voice”), the substantive side of reflexive law could not have been con-
ceived in a more radical fashion. Giving up any hope to ground a viable legal judgment 
on principle based on rational consideration, on faith, or on specific political views, re-
flexive law theorists argued that the responses of law to a specific context would inevi-
tably emerge as a result of never-ending processes of specialized rationality colli-
sions.157 
In this way, reflexive law took seriously the longstanding contention of law’s peren-
nial indeterminacy,158 but it went further than that. While the critique of legal formalism 
as an ideology and a mask to cover up political motives and economic rationalities159 
asserted the possibility of identifying a specific political concept or regulatory idea, 
which could be taken as the basis of a legal decision (the “social” or “material” chal-
lenge to formal law),160 reflexive law came to reject such mono-causalities of, say, poli-
tics, or the economy, as explaining legal decision-making. Once it was found impossible 
to determine the content of the law without uncovering the values, ideas and interests 
that had found their way into a norm, it became clear that the law, being operationally 
closed and cognitively open, had to be seen as standing in a very particular relationship 
with those social spheres, which are themselves determined by rationalities other than 
those that governed law and legal thinking. It is here that the reflexive law theorists 
moved beyond the critique of the indeterminacy of law developed by the legal realists 
and critical legal studies and radicalized the idea of law’s indeterminacy to reconstruct 
law as one rationality among others in society. As a result, society itself ceased to be 
conceivable as a unified, overseeable and identifiable entity against which it is possible 
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to uncover the ideological basis of law.161 Such a model of society makes it impossible 
for lawyers to identify one single, decisive motive behind a legal argument. Instead, the 
task of lawyers would be to recognize the many ways in which the law is in fact respon-
sive to and reflexive of the many different societal rationalities, which the law was 
charged to “translate” or to “reformulate” into its own language, using the legal code.162 
Law, in this understanding, is to be conceived as both distinct—when considering its 
own rationality and ways of “thinking” and “speaking”—and simultaneously immersed 
in society’s ongoing process of differentiation, conflict and experimentation. “A reflex-
ive orientation does not ask whether there are social problems to which the law must be 
responsive. Instead it seeks to identify opportunity structures that allow legal regulation 
to cope with social problems without, at the same time, irreversibly destroying patterns 
of social life.”163 
B. Faces in the Mirror 
“One can reject the imperialist claims of the criterion of efficiency and at the same time use 
economic knowledge 
in order to understand what happens when the logic 
of legal structures and that of economic structures 
impinge on each other.”164 
 
It is important to keep this background in mind, when assessing contemporary devel-
opments. Today’s combination of neo-formalism and neo-functionalism occurs “after 
the welfare state” and in denial of it. It portrays law’s primary role as serving society’s 
needs to govern itself and thereby blinds us to the historically grown embeddedness of 
private ordering in a sophisticated legal-pluralist framework. What today’s functional-
ism suggests is a smooth ride in social self-regulation from which the law should, for 
the most part, be excluded or at least be kept at a distance. It thereby obscures the 
deeply conflictual and hybrid nature of legal regulation of which scholars throughout 
the twentieth century had always been so conscious. Whereas historically formalism 
and functionalism related to each other by way of conceptual and political contestation, 
it seems today that both formalism and functionalism have joined ideologically in that 
both present law as a politically neutralized tool of expert management. This turns the 
earlier, historical turn of lawyers to science and expertise165 on its head. The neutraliza-
tion of law has consequences: on the one hand, law is expected today to function in its 
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traditional mode where “true” legal expertise is required, for example in the protection 
of property interests through the formal application of allegedly “clear” legal norms.166 
On the other hand, law should be reflexive, meaning facilitative, indirectly intervening, 
empowering, where external expertise—mostly of “market,” but also of the “scientific” 
kind—is believed to be better equipped to facilitate social ordering. This combination is 
ideological because both of these fields of expertise are considered a-political, when in 
fact in all these references to “law,” the “market,” and “experts,” the choice takes place 
within political, economic and other normative frameworks. Neo-formalism and neo-
functionalism transform formalism and functionalism respectively. Formalism is no 
longer seen as aspiring to, or supported by, a specific or general logical coherence; in-
stead, it becomes a fighting word against what is now deemed to be legal “intervention” 
into otherwise more efficient processes of social self-governance. Functionalism is no 
longer associated with the aspiration to achieve a specific goal and with the political 
debate out of which a consensus in support of that goal eventually arose; instead, all 
legal intervention is to take place or to be withheld in accord with, and in response to, 
the “needs” of a functional group. It is the particular context, the political climate and 
capacity to promote certain views that shapes the communication of such needs. 
The current revival of both formalism and functionalism occurs according to a regu-
latory agenda and political outlook entirely different from that of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Two developments are of relevance here: one concerns the 
delay with which the changed social environment was methodologically assessed by 
administrative and, certainly, by constitutional law scholars.167 The other one arises 
from the unresolved status of the political relevance of the rule of law or, in other 
words, the role of law in regulation. The urgency of questioning what lies behind this 
misalignment is further manifested by the manner in which progressive agendas are 
today again clashing with claims to technical expertise. What we see colliding are 
claims of bureaucratic discretion with those of judicial and democratic review and con-
trol as well as claims of individual autonomy with concerns over paternalistic public 
governance by the state.168 The recurrence of the same oppositional patterns, which al-
ready characterized administrative law debates over one-hundred years ago,169 prompts 
the question what the differences might be between the discussions then and those tak-
ing place now. What occupies the space between the rise of the Providential State of the 
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early twentieth century170 and the Enabling State of the early twenty-first? This unan-
swered question drives the powerful revival of formalism and functionalism in current 
regulatory theory and practice.171 
1. The Turn to Market 
“If the future already lay in history’s wallet, the social-political task was to call its 
impending forms into being.”172 
 
Across the divides of disciplinary subfields, a growing number of scholars are promot-
ing the return to a strictly limited role of the law in favor of a market-based regime of 
self-regulation. The neo-formalists and neo-functionalists confess to a troubling loss of 
faith in adjudication173 in the name of an approach to legal regulation that is allegedly 
more responsive to market demands and less prone to the much-contested attempts at 
social engineering by judges.174 The renewed hostility towards judges is nourished by 
decades of policy-driven, substantivist judicial interpretation of legal rules.175 The invo-
cation of formalism now serves to tame, stifle and silence a judiciary, which is seen as 
“activist” and overzealous.176 
The lack of sophistication of this analysis is striking. If it were really true that there 
can be an effective rule making and rule application, but that it should not be placed in 
the hands of overzealous judges, we could indeed be prompted to take the anti-judiciary 
affect seriously. Instead, the attack on judges becomes an attack on the law itself, which 
the neo-formalist reduces to a spiritless, technical body of rules, allegedly made by men 
and best placed in the hands of men—not of judges. This move against the judiciary and 
the law seeks to obscure the fundamental quality of rules, which are, in the moment that 
they are applied through a commonly established institutional set-up, always already 
“pieces in a larger compromise of interests” and as such not amenable to ad-hoc 
changes, whether in the name of “justice” or any other “spirit.”177 
To be sure, the problem that motivates the critique of adjudication is not whether it is 
judges, parliaments or administrative agencies that are making rules. It is the idea that 
law is a part of a larger normative framework, the actual realization of which has been, 
mostly for historically contingent reasons,178 placed within a particular institutional, 
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complex political, socio-economic framework that is particularly troubling to the neo-
formalists and neo-functionalists. It is for this reason that appeals to legislative action 
over judicial activism or, say the work of expert committees,179 are mere smoke and 
mirrors. Even if the legislator demanded of the judge to act “formally,” it would still be 
the case that the judge must ask exactly the same question about this rule as about any 
other that comes to him (or her) from the legislature. Its enactment represented a com-
promise of interests based on some set of quite possibly conflicting expectations about 
how its application would affect the future distribution of satisfactions.180 
This new confidence in a formalist understanding of law is accompanied by a power-
ful and highly influential defense of functionalist approaches to legal regulation. Judges 
and, for that matter, lawmakers, should “interfere” with societal processes of self-
organization only where there is a legitimate basis for such intervention, which means 
that they should usually abstain. The critique of the role of judges is thus intimately tied 
to a radical critique of the state and of law as both an institution and instrument of social 
change. Whereas at the height of the turn-of-the-century Interventionist and emerging 
welfare state functionalism would encompass the administration’s use of law as an in-
strument of social change, often pushed forward against the resistance of a conserva-
tively staffed judiciary,181 today’s neo-functionalism seeks to domesticate both the state 
and the judiciary by emphasizing state institutions’ incompetence to properly order so-
ciety. Instead, the neo-functionalist emphasizes society’s quasi-natural powers to self-
regulate its affairs, without undue and ill-fitting intervention by public authorities. 
2. Conceptual Paths 
Conceptually, form and function have always been two sides of the same coin. The ap-
peal of formalism to coherence, authority and unity stands in an ambiguous relation to 
the aspiration of functionalism to substantive goals, ends-means correlations182 and in-
stitutional instrumentalization. But the modesty of one—formalism—is the hubris of the 
other—functionalism. The functionalist’s submission of legal instruments to substantive 
goals had to reckon with the normative grounds of formal guarantees, rights, and proce-
dures. Recognizing that the grounds of legal unity and legal instrumentalism are inher-
ently caught in a paradoxical relation,183 formalists and functionalists saw how they 
were inextricably intertwined so that one approach could never exist without the other. 
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Against the background of rich historical and conceptual studies, comparative legal 
scholarship has only slowly begun to explore the parallels, disjunctures and overlaps 
between public and private regulatory law here and there. After conflict of laws scholars 
had already posited the need to embed their assessments in a deeper comparative under-
standing of the existing public/private regulatory cultures in different countries in the 
1970s,184 impulses today are coming from administrative law scholars on the one hand185 
and constitutionalization scholars on the other.186 As these inquiries continue, one can—
unsurprisingly—recognize a distinct renaissance of visions of social order without for-
mal law elements lying at their base.187 While not intended, this “new legal pluralism,” 
as pointed out by its discontents,188 runs the risk of sailing hard on the winds of neo-
liberal, deregulatory politics.189 
It is against this background that we may gain a deeper, contextualized, understand-
ing of the present dominance of functionalism in many fields of law and policy on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Certainly after 1989, there has been an ever more widely held view 
that we are witnessing a global convergence of modes of thinking about economic regu-
lation and state governance. The “end of history,” so famously declared by Fukuyama in 
1992,190 eventually eclipsed the account by Michel Albert, who even in light of strong 
trends of convergence, differences between capitalist regimes would remain strong.191 
The pervasive power of the end of history thesis in law has put promoters of differenti-
ated, historically informed assessments of the role of law as an instrument of social 
change on the defensive, while allowing for ubiquitous references to the law and the 
“rule of law” to occur in even the most complex regulatory contexts.192 
3. Déjà Vu? The Discursive Return of Reflexive Law 
The current operation of formalist/functionalist concepts in legal regulation builds on 
regulatory experiences that unfolded in the last few decades and that are without direct 
parallels to the first waves of formalist thinking at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth 
centuries. It is an important feature of the current legal regulatory discourse that its par-
ticipants are arguing against the background of a complicated and sobering set of ex-
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periences with law.193 From the impossibility of preventing outrageous crime194 to law’s 
exhaustion throughout the ambitious progressive political attempts to consolidate 
“rights” as core assets in a liberal society,195 law has come to be conceptualized as play-
ing a highly ambivalent role in a deregulatory, privatized environment.196 The long-term 
consequences of the recent, admittedly moderate, experimentations with finding a ‘third 
way’ between socialism and capitalism are still matters of speculation.197 Meanwhile, 
the law has become a problematic, at best ambivalent, and often seemingly unreliable 
player in the discursive set of contemporary politics.198 Law’s memory becomes increas-
ingly short-lived, and high stakes of political contestation, such as the fight over con-
sumer protection rights,199 are eventually leveled and comfortably integrated into main-
stream legal discourse. It becomes ever more difficult to trace, let alone to teach, the 
reality of conflict over rights even in recent history.200 Because of the hegemony of eco-
nomic thinking in law,201 law is caught in polarizing debates over efficiency vs. plan-
ning, private vs. public ordering, self-government vs. command/control, etc. Still, con-
temporary discussions about the merits and limits of privatization should always be 
taken as reflections on a long-standing struggle over social emancipation and contested 
forms of political government. Contractual governance is in the center of contemporary 
privatization and post-privatization discourses.202 
IV. CONTRACT VERSUS CONTRACT LAW: THE FALSE PROMISE OF SOCIAL 
NORMS 
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to a brief discussion of how formal-
ist/functionalist legal thinking has become crucial in a central area of contemporary 
regulatory debate. The neo-formalist and neo-functionalist turn of contractual govern-
ance reveals how variations of responsive/reflexive law have further accentuated the 
detachment of contract regulation from a larger political contestation of the goals of 
                                                 
193. See already the famous debate between (Hart 1958), and (Fuller 1958); see also (Bazyler 2001). 
194. (Power 2003). 
195. (Trubek and Galanter 1974). 
196. (Teubner 1999). 
197. (Giddens 1999); (Giddens 2006). 
198. (Habermas 2003). 
199. See (Ramsay 1991); (Ramsay 1993); (Maurer 2007). 
200. (Howells and Wilhelmsson 2003). 
201. See, generally, (Laval 2007). “. . . la science économique se constitue comme discours de connaissance positive 
d’une réalité qui a ses propres lois et ne veut plus dépendre d’autres considerations de la morale et de la politique, 
rejetées comme étrangères au champ économique.” Id. (Hutchinson 1995) “For all the hard work of the consumer 
lobby, the increasing domination of homo economicus is illustrated by the fact that public discourse has become 
hostage to economics and has begun to dance to, instead of call, the economic tune . . .” Id. 
202. (Teubner 1999). 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 82) 
- 27 - 
contractual governance. Yet, the response cannot simply be to aim at a re-politicization 
of contract law. Against the theoretical background of a functionally differentiated soci-
ety, it is more adequate to understand contract law as a troubled site of intense regula-
tory experimentation and innovation. Contract law is a central example of “law after the 
welfare state,” because it represents a regulatory regime that is constituted and shaped 
by an ambiguous relationship between “state” and “society” in the institutional evolu-
tion from the Rule of law to the welfare state. In the neo-formalist and neo-functionalist 
reading, however, contractual governance is offered as a formidable solution to the 
paradox of formalist/functionalist law, which it manages in turn to eclipse in its entirety. 
A. Social Norms versus Law? 
The present contestation of contract adjudication and the promotion of social norms as 
offering a more efficient regulatory framework than governance by contract law203 is a 
representation par excellence of private law “after the welfare state.” This invocation of 
social self-regulation, which is primarily fuelled by a deep skepticism about the political 
regulation of commercial relations, is further accentuated in the context of an increas-
ingly de-territorialized sphere of economic interaction.204 To be sure, the reference to the 
transnational nature of commercial activity serves as a ground for turning against con-
tract adjudication also on the domestic level. Another lesson of the twentieth century 
regulatory experience with reflexive law is—deliberately—cast aside: in order to fully 
understand the dynamics of regulatory politics on a larger scale, we need to carefully 
trace the contextual conditions under which we make legal arguments. In the reduction-
ist form in which ‘traditionalists’ are contrasted with “transnationalists”205 it is to be 
feared that the fight for recognition of the latter results in the undoing of the emancipa-
tion of the former. 
In turn, the maneuvering room for courts adjudicating derailed contractual arrange-
ments is shrinking as social norms are seen as providing a comparatively more efficient 
and cost-reducing regulatory tool.206 The legal system recedes into the background from 
where contract parties merely perceive it as a threat, not as fundamentally structuring 
the arrangements to begin with. This approach to social norms breaks not only with the 
analysis of the political basis of both contractual arrangements and the market;207 it also 
aims to disentangle contractual governance from the socio-economic, formal/informal 
context in which actors make choices. This marks the social norms theorists’ deliberate 
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departure from work on relational contract and “private government”208 that had grown 
out of the legal realist critique of classical legal contract theory.209 Earlier work by pro-
gressive lawyers had identified the growing difficulties of situating modern contractual 
governance in either the public (law) or private (law) realm, recognizing that both were 
two sides of the same coin of contractual governance.210 In contrast, social norms schol-
ars from law and economics (L&E) seek to redraw the demarcation lines between the 
market and the state. Their interest in social norms is not in the basis of norm-making as 
part of a larger exploration of sites of social will-formation, but instead reflects their 
intention to insulate phenomena of contemporary regulatory governance from more 
comprehensive assessments of the contexts in which governance modes are emerging. 
B. Economics versus Justice 
“A post-industrial society must discover ways to  
decentralize not only commodity production,  
but also significant ways of lawmaking.”211 
 
The recent “discovery” of social norms by L&E scholars212 occurs in striking insulation 
not only from a longstanding and intense scholarly debate,213 but also from a tremen-
dously rich and troubled historical evolution of regulatory politics in the area of contract 
law. With little historical interest in such accounts, the L&E interest in norms is biased 
towards a particular, efficiency-oriented understanding of norms and regulation in pre-
sent-day contestations of allegedly excessive state intervention. This approach, how-
ever, closes all doors on a more nuanced understanding of the forever fragile relation-
ship between social norms and the legal form, one that stood at the centre of landmark 
work in the sociology of law.214 It in fact makes a mockery of long-standing insights 
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into the artificial nature of all legal propositions.215 Instead of perceiving social norms as 
“living law” and as a platform for a more comprehensive exploration of present-day 
regulatory proposals against the background of the evolutionary trajectory of welfare 
and post-welfare state “regulatory cultures,”216 today’s neo-formalists and neo-
functionalists’ attack on law is more than a mere plea to recognize the (self-)regulatory 
capacity of social norms. It is, rather, the rejection of a critical assessment of how norms 
are being translated into law, how legal formation takes place in the context of highly 
differentiated and, thus, always contested spheres of social activity. What really lies 
behind the plea for social norms over law is not a genuine interest in norm-formation 
but a disregard for processes of negotiation and contestation. This explains the hesitant 
reception of legal sociology and the even greater reluctance towards legal pluralism in 
the otherwise wholehearted proclamation of the primacy of norms over law. While so-
ciological and legal pluralist research on norms has for a long time failed to exert sig-
nificant influence on norm-theory, perhaps because of the area’s preoccupation with 
groups as “operative agents” and L&E scholars’ respective focus on “methodological 
individualism,”217 there are a few signs for change.218 Clearly, the demand for a fuller 
appreciation of sociological and legal pluralist work in the ongoing exploration of the 
law after the welfare state is enormous, and one can reasonably expect that the sophisti-
cation of the research in increasingly combining domestic perspectives with careful 
studies of emerging transnational regulatory patterns will eventually influence the pre-
sent work on norms. 
The current introspection is important in the context of this paper not only because it 
illustrates the contentious relationship between formal and informal law, an understand-
ing of which is central to present studies of contemporary law making developments in 
different areas of law.219 The new interest in norms also underlines the precarious status 
of legal regulation per se. In an increasingly transnational regulatory environment, con-
tractual governance—traditionally torn between contentions of contract’s political na-
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norms had become the “hottest topic in the legal academy”); see also the Symposium on “Norms and Corporate 
Law,” published in the 1996 volume of the U. PA.. L. Rev.; see also the contributions in (Appelbaum, Felstiner 
and Gessner 2001) 
219. See, e.g., (Snyder 2003); (Deakin 2002); (Calliess 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=531063; (Zumbansen 2002b); (Zumbansen 2006b). 
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ture and private autonomy—unfolds in a polycontextural sphere which renders any at-
tempt to safely anchor contract law in this or that social theory, largely futile.220 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has traced the rising prominence of formalism and functionalism in diverse 
areas of “post-welfare state” legal regulation as un-ironic recurrences of the twentieth 
century’s quest for law. Today, formalist, functionalist, responsive, reflexive and auto-
poietic law is everywhere. Lawyers can snatch up everything and make it their own—a 
matter of conversation, the subject of a lawsuit or an essential element of a social uto-
pia, seen now through a lawyer’s eyes. But the real conceptual contribution of autopoi-
etic law to the previously revisited historical narrative of formalist/functionalist law is 
one that is, strikingly, at the center of contemporary assessments of institutional devel-
opment.221 The concept of autopoietic law helps to carve out the particularity of the le-
gal operation in distinction to any other form of societal communication, be it politics, 
religion, art or economics. Law’s particularity relies on its self-referentiality, its being 
thrown back onto its own mode of operation, its self-referential reproduction of its sys-
tem’s content and form through its code, unique to law and at the basis of any aspiration 
to unity and cohesion.222 The radicality of the concept is becomes apparent when we 
contrast the historical with the conceptual sketch. Whereas the former would “find” law 
to be, at least since Western modernity, invariably tied up with different emanations of 
the state,223 autopoietic law detaches law from its—historically contingent—institutional 
affiliation, but understands law in its raw exposure to its social environment. In that 
sense, law in fact is everywhere, and it has no choice. The law’s presence in societal 
conflict is brought into even sharper relief when we see that its institutional constella-
tion with the state is only one among endless possibilities of law’s exposure to and its 
role in society.  Autopoietic law, then, radicalizes the particularity of law’s operation by 
emphasizing its self-referential code-driven quality on the one hand while laying bare 
law’s openness, diffusion, vulnerability and fragility in societal processes on the other. 
This gives an entirely new meaning to the formalism/functionalism narrative that we 
have seen to be central to law’s trajectory in the twentieth century. Autopoietic law em-
phasizes how both the positivist and critical descriptions of formalism underestimate the 
closure of law’s self-referential reproduction, which only operates through law-internal 
terminology. While the legal positivist pays a high price for law’s inner coherence,224 
                                                 
220. For a comprehensive discussion, see (Calliess and Zumbansen forthcoming). 
221. (North 1990); (David 1994). 
222. (Luhmann 1988b). 
223. (Jansen and Michaels 2007). 
224. By positing a Grundnorm at the basis of all law, (Kelsen 1941); (Kelsen 1961). 
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the critical legal scholar risks losing law as form by decrying it as camouflage for dif-
ferent emanations of power. In turn, autopoietic law radicalizes the functionalist’s in-
strumentalization of law as a means of social engineering by leaving the driver’s seat 
empty. Rejecting the idea that law, from any single “outside” point, could determine the 
outcome of social conflicts, autopoietic law stresses the way in which law is a mere, yet 
highly particular, form of communication. Building on the concept of a functionally 
differentiated society, the law can no longer be seen as performing a particularly deter-
minative or representative function with regard to economic, political or other interests 
but itself can only perform a legal function. Instead of being removed from society, law 
is part of it, everywhere exposed to and in communication with it. 
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